Fingerprinting scheme uses digital watermarks to trace originator of unauthorized or pirated copies, however, multiple users may collude and escape identification by creating an average or median of their individually watermarked copies. Previous research works are based on ACC (anti-collusion code) for identifying each user, however, ACC are shown to be resilient to average and median attacks, but not to LCCA and cannot support large number of users. In this paper, we propose a practical SACC (scalable anti-collusion code) scheme and its angular decoding strategy to support a large number of users from basic ACC (anti-collusion code) with LCCA (linear combination collusion attack) robustness. To make a scalable ACC, we designed a scalable extension of ACC codebook using a Gaussian distributed random variable, and embedded the resulting fingerprint using human visual system based watermarking scheme. We experimented with standard test images for colluder identification performance, and our scheme shows good performance over average and median attacks.
Introduction 1)
A digital watermark is an invisible mark inserted in in the palette. If red and blue colored users collude, the content shall be violet. Because the violet color is not in content owner's palette, red and blue colored users will be captured, however, if the violet was already in the palette, innocent user can be suspected. Boneh assumes marking assumption, which state that the colluders can compare with their copies, identify different marks, and change it. However, undetectable marks cannot be arbitrarily changed without rendering the object useless. Therefore, the undetectable marks will be clues to colluders. To put it simply, we can increase the collusion robustness as the fingerprint gets similar to each other. However, we should have more different marks to distinguish the more users.
An early work on designing collusion-resistant binary fingerprint codes for generic data was based on marking assumption, which attackers can compare values of and can even change with making un-readable different marks. However, undetectable marks cannot be arbitrarily changed without rendering the object useless. But multimedia data have very different characteristics from generic data. Therefore we can spread different marks or fingerprints in overall images, which is biased strict marking assumption. Recently, there is an improvement to merge the low level code (primitive code) with the direct sequence spread spectrum embedding for multimedia and extend the marking assumption to allow random jamming [1] . W. Trappe presented the design of collusion-resistant fingerprints using code modulation. They proposed a (k-1) collusion-resistant fingerprints scheme, and the (k-1) resilient ACC is derived from (v, k, 1) balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) [2] . The resulting (k-1) resilient ACC code vectors are v-dimensional, and can represent n = (v 2 -v) / (k 2 -k) users with these v basis vectors. However, recent research shows that LCCA (linear combination collusion attack) can successfully make collusion for ACC based fingerprinting schemes [3] . In addition, ACC which derived from BIBD cannot provide flexible coding parameters for practical fingerprinting use. We review previous approach for collision robustness in section 2, In section 3 and we present a scalable ACC fingerprinting design scheme, which extends ACC for large number of user support. We also present an improved detection scheme using the angular decoding strategy to be robust on LCCA. In section 4 we evaluate our scheme with standard test images, and show good collusion detection performance over average, median, and linear combination collusion attacks. We conclude in Section 5.
Related Works
An early work on designing collusion-resistant binary fingerprint codes was presented by Boneh and Shaw in 1995 [4] , which primarily considered the problem of fingerprinting generic data that satisfy an underlying principle referred to as the marking assumption. A fingerprint consists of a collection of marks, which take a finite number of states. A mark is considered to be detectable when a coalition of users does not have the same mark in that position. The marking assumption states that undetectable marks cannot be arbitrarily changed without rendering the object useless; however, it is considered possible for the colluding set to change a detectable mark to any state (collusion framework). Under the collusion framework, Boneh and Shaw show that it is not possible to totally design c-secure codes, which are fingerprint codes that are capable of tracing at least one colluder out of a coalition of at most c colluders. Instead, they used hierarchical design and randomization techniques to construct c-secure codes that are able to capture one colluder out of a coalition of up to c colluders with high probability.
The construction of c-secure codes involves three stages:
(1) the construction of base code using primitive codes, To embed fingerprinted signal into still images, we use the equation (2) where yj is j th user's fingerprinted image, X is a host image, and α is scaling factor.
To determine who colluders are, W. Trappe used the v dimensional collusion detection vector (T ), which is correlation between Wj and { } i⋅ u as following equation (3).
Next, we convert T vector to binary values (ˆb T ) using a predefined threshold value, which determinates detection performance. Checking the '1' position between ˆb T and j ⋅ c (j th user's signature), we can decide that j th user is suspected to be a traitor. This collusion detection procedure (hard detection) is suggested by W. Trappe with other two detection strategies (adaptive sorting approach, sequential algorithm), however, he did not consider any detection strategies for the linear combination collusion attack [2] . The linear collusion attack is generalized by the following equation (4), where z denotes additive noise. If j th user does not participate in collusion, the coefficient of j th user will be zero (
. There are two constraints:
(1)
(not to decrease quality of image) and (2) if j th and k th users participate in collusion, j k β β ≈ (to equalize the probability of captured) [6] . 
The anti-collusion code can be resilient to average attack, which is shown in equation (5) For fingerprint generation, we select one mark from M marks. The selected mark will be one of ACC, and the other marks will be lambda. For example, when the fingerprint ID is f(2,3), it means that we embed ACC #3 code in second mark, and Lambda on the other marks. Finally, the code is repeated R times and permuted. Like Boneh's scheme, the permutation sequence is unique to all users, but unknown to attackers. It also prevents interleaving collusion attack.
We embed fingerprint block by block basis, and we should select M times R suitable blocks to hide fingerprint signals as shown in equation (7) . We exploited human visual sensitivity using noise visibility function [7, 8] . Each selected blocks are added by anti-collusion code or lambda code. Lambda code is generated using Gaussian distributed random sequence as described in [9] .
,
To make scalable-ACC robust median attack, we should have lambda signal, which is similar to ACC signal and the variance of lambda is important factor; the ( Figure   1 
of lambda to be 16 (which is equal to v parameter of BIBD code design) when we use (16, 4, 1)-BIBD code.
However, lambda signal can degrade the detection precision.
To achieve detection performance and median attack robustness, all signals are repeated.
For fingerprint extraction, we used non-blind scheme.
For each block, we compute equation (8) and k f s are inversely permuted.
To detect colluder, we used the code matrix T in equation (9) 
Equation (10) is composed of ,m i t 's power and p-value.
We compute ,m i t 's power using m P τ μ = , which is the probability of ,m i t 'being derived from λ , using the equation (11). 
. d is the processing error and noise, that can be observed at T . To estimate β, we must find the following equation (12): [11, 12] .
Equation (12) is called least square problem and finding exact solution is NP-hard [11] . If the β 's domain is finite, we can use sphere decoding to solve equation 
Proof: We can compute The number of different-sign elements D is (
C C , and the number of same-sign elements S is
. Using Lemma 1, we can simplify the D and S as follows.
The norm of j th user's fingerprint code (
To identify colluder, we compute the angles between T and each user's fingerprint codes ( j ⋅ c ) using equation (13) . If j th user participates in collusion, the angle jt a between j th user's fingerprint code and T is closer to 0 or π . 
Analysis and Experimental Results
We experimented with the standard test images. To We tested our scalable fingerprinting code for various collusion attacks (average, median, min, max, min-max, modified negative, randomized negatives and LCCA) for the test images. Taking the average of their copies is widely used as average collusion attack [13] , because it is efficient to attack fingerprints, and also it makes better image quality after collusion (usually it increases 4-5 dB). (Fig. 3) shows a collusion example, when five colluders make pirated copies from their fingerprinted copies. (Figure 3) shows original image, five fingerprinted images, and colluded images after average, median, and LCCA.. As shown in (Figure 3) , the average and median attacks make better image quality after collusion; however, LCCA spoils the quality of colluded image. There are many ways for collusion in LCCA, and we use the following equation for our LCCA collusion. under various collusion attack cases. After the LCCA, the angular decoding scheme shows better performance than hard decision scheme for large population case, because hard decision cannot set the optimal detection threshold as the number of users or colluders, whereas angular decoding exploits the knowledge of minimum angle between each users and maximize the colluder detection performance.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a scalable ACC fingerprinting scheme, which covers large number of fingerprint codes and angular decoding strategy robust to LCCA. An ACC (anti-collusion code) is hard to support large number of users (To support large users, the length of basis must be long. The longer basis is hard to hide and handle) and does not consider linear combination collusion attack. We constructed the scalable fingerprint by spreading BIBD codes over M×R (M: number of marks; R: repetition factor) image blocks. To improve the detection performance, we repeated embedding the same fingerprints over R image blocks. To increase the robustness over average and median attack, we designed a scalable ACC scheme using a Gaussian distributed random variable. We evaluated our fingerprints on standard test images, and showed good collusion detection performance over average and median collusion attacks and moderate performance over LCCA. An angular decoding strategy makes ACC invulnerable to LCCA. Although the scalability scheme makes collusion more complex and decreases detection performance of angular decoding strategy; it can be easily controlled by the supported max users. 
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